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PRESUMED FUNCTIONAL UNTIL REBUTTED: THE
INCREASED DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING TRADE
DRESS PROTECTION WITH AN EXPIRED UTILITY
PATENT
Nancy Sya*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Visualizing trademark law and patent law as two circles
that slightly intersect one another helps illustrate how a small
subset of issues can intertwine these two distinct areas of
To the casual observer, the
intellectual property law.
significance of this small intersection, known as trade dress, may
not be obvious. However, trade dress has evolved into a
complex and contentious area of intellectual property law,
where enormous interests are at stake.1 Trade dress is a subset
of trademark law that protects the total image of a product,2
thereby helping consumers identify the source of the product.
Subject to restrictions on functionality, trade dress can hold an
indefinite monopoly over the physical features of an existing
product in the market. 3 However, functionality is synonymous
with utility; functionality in physical features becomes further
complicated when there is a utility patent on the product for

* Managing Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 43. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; M.B.A., San Jose State University; B.S.,
Pennsylvania State University.
1. See infra Part 1I.
2.

See

DONALD

S.

CHISUM

&

MICHAEL

A.

JACOBS,

UNDERSTANDING

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5C, at 5-31 (1992). Lanham Act Section 43(a) provides
protection against the likelihood of confusion when others implement similar trade
dress. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2001).
3. The registration of a trade dress would last for a period of ten years. Set! 15

U.S.C. § 1058 (2001). The registration can be renewed for periods of ten years. See
15 U.S.C. § 1059 (2001). The Supreme Court has noted that "trademarks may be
renewed in perpetuity." Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165
(1995).
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which trade dress protection is sought. 4
In its latest trade dress decision, Traffix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court reshaped the trade
dress landscape. The Court compared the functionality of the
disputed feature with the presumption of that feature's
functionality stemming from an expired utility patent claiming
the feature. The Traffix decision represents a departure from
many federal circuit court decisions, in which courts evaluated
the functionality of the disputed features, while considering the
company's need to imitate product design in order to remain
competitive in the market. 6
The ways in which the Supreme Court limits functionality
for trade dress protection have substantial intellectual property
implications. If the Court's latest test leaves too much room for
a company to successfully assert trade dress for a feature
mentioned in a utility patent, then the company can capitalize
on this a loophole to obtain a monopoly over that feature even
after the patent expires, frustrating the purpose of a patent as a
temporary monopoly.7 On the other hand, if the Traffix test is
more restrictive on trade dress, it may prompt legal scholars and
intellectual property practitioners to question the desirability of
trade dress protection in favor of exploring new solutions.
With the latest test for functionality now settled through the
Traffix decision, this comment presents insights to
understanding the application of Traffix in future trade dress
cases. Part II of this comment examines the history and
background of relevant statutes and case law leading up to
Traffix, as well as other related areas of intellectual property
law.8 Next, Part III describes the problems raised by the Traffix

decision.9 Part IV analyzes the impact of the Traffix decision.10
Finally, Part V proposes a solution to the functionality issues
raised in Traffix. 1
4. See generally Michael E. Peters,

ihen Patent and Trademark Law Hit the Fan:

Potential Effects of Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. on Legal
Protectionfor IndustrialDesign, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 123, 125-26 (1996).
5. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
6. See Gwendolyn Gill, Through the Back Door: Attempts to Use Trade Dress to
Protect Expired Patents, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1269, 1293 (1999) (referring to Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995)).
7. See generally Gill, supra note 6.
8. See infra Part 1I.
9. See infra Part 11I.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND

A.

Patent Law Overview

Federal patent law is rooted in the United States
Constitution, which called on Congress "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
Under its
respective Writings
and
Discoveries." 12
constitutionally-conferred power, Congress enacted the first
statutory requirements for patents in 1790, and has continued to
13
enact and modify patent statutes since then.
For an invention to be patentable under federal law, it must
be novel, nonobvious, and useful.' 4 Inventions may include
"machines, devices, chemical compositions, and manufacturing
processes."' 5
A new invention satisfies the novelty
requirement.' 6 An invention is obvious if a publication, a
previously granted patent, or a combination of patents or
publications would have shown an ordinary person skilled in
the area of the invention how to make the invention, even if
these items did not disclose the exact invention.17 Finally, an
invention must have utility to meet the usefulness requirement.' 8
When these three requirements have been successfully met, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or just PTO)
grants a utility patent for the claimed invention. 19 The PTO
issues protection for utility patents for a period of twenty years
20
from the filing date of the original application.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 2B, at 2-9 to 2-16.
14. See id. § 2A, at 2-8.
15. Id.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001). This section of the statute ensures that only new
inventions are patented by demonstrating that the inventions did not exist before.
See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 323 (2d ed. 2001).
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2001).
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
19. The PTO would send a notice of allowance, informing the applicant of the
issue fee amount and the three month due date, in which this three-month period
cannot be extended. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.311 (2001). The actual issuance of the patent
will follow after the timely payment of the issue fee. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.314 (2001).
20. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(2) (2001). "All patents (other than design patents)
that were in force prior to June 8, 1995, or that issued on an application filed before
June 8, 1995, have a term that is the greater of twenty years or seventeen years from
the grant." MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2701 (8th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter MPEP] (further explaining 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)). The Uruguay Round
Agreements Act effectively amended the patent term. See id. Prior to the Uruguay
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To obtain a utility patent, a patent examiner at the PTO
examines the applicant's invention for novelty, nonobviousness,
and utility by reviewing the completed application. 21 The
application must include a specification and any drawings
necessary to facilitate the understanding of the invention. 22 The
specification comprises a detailed description of the invention,
an explanation of how to produce or utilize the invention that
enables one skilled in the inventive area to follow reasonably,
and the claims made of the invention. 23 The description and the
explanation must disclose the best mode of the invention, which
is the best way to create the invention based on the inventor's
knowledge at the time of the application. 24 The claims section
describes the details of what the inventor considers to be his
invention, 25 and serves as the basis for the patent grant. 26 After
the PTO grants a patent, that patent becomes publicly
27
available.
In addition to utility patents, the PTO also grants design
patents for original, ornamental designs for "an article of
28
manufacture," as opposed to a design for aesthetic purposes.
The design cannot be functional and must also meet the same
statutory requirements as in the case of a utility patent
The
application, such as novelty and nonobviousness. 29

Round Agreement Act, the utility patent term would last seventeen years from its
grant. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 2E, at 2-213.
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2001).
22. See id.

23. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, paras. 1-2 (2001).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1.
25. See id. § 112, para. 2.
26. See id. "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
This statutory requirement is further
applicant regards as his invention."
elucidated by the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, which states this
part of the application as "the definition of that for which protection is granted."
See MPEP, supra note 20, § 608.01(k). Patent prosecutors refer to the MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, in which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

provides a comprehensive set of guidelines.
27. See generally Bonito Boats, Inc v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 15051 (1989) (discussing the mutual benefits that the inventor and the public would
receive in the issuance of a patent). By disclosing his knowledge of his invention,
the inventor would receive an exclusive right in making, using, or selling his
invention for a limited duration, while the public would utilize the teachings from
this disclosure. See id.
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2001).

29. See id. One can infer that the ornamentality requirement leads to a nonfunctionality requirement. See, e.g., MPEP, supra note 20, § 1504.01(c).
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protection period for a design patent is fourteen years from the
30
date the patent is granted.
Contrary to popular misconceptions, a patent does not
provide the patent holder the right to make, use, or sell the
protected invention. 31
Instead, patent law rewards the
innovation and assiduousness of an inventor by extending him
or her a monopoly of limited duration in the form of the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed
invention.32 This right allows the patent holder to recover
research and development costs over a known time period
without having to deal with competition. 33 For the PTO to grant
this privilege from the government, the patent holder must
disclose a clear description of the invention in the claims, an
enabling explanation of how the invention is used or made, and
the "best mode" for making the invention. 34 Once the patent
expires, the information disclosed in the patent is dedicated to
the public, and becomes available for anyone to make, use, or
sell. 35 This quid pro quo in patent law serves three major
purposes: (1) it provides incentives and rewards for innovation
and invention; (2) it encourages the disclosure of inventions to
advance science and bestow the information to the public for its
use after the expiration of the patent; and (3) it assures that only
truly novel inventions are granted patent protection, so that any
invention already available to the public is not later removed
and offered to a single inventor as a monopoly. 36
B.

Trademark Law Overview

The concept of trademarks has existed for centuries across
the globe. 37 Archaeologists have unearthed artifacts in the
Middle and Far East with symbols, designating the mark of
38
particular craftsmen, long before the practice began in Europe.
Not until the Middle Ages did the European guild members
start to affix their mark upon the goods they produced, as both a
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2001).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See generally Gill, supra note 6.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2001).
See Gill, supra note 6, at 1275-76.
See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150.
See Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1998).

37. See ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 155 (3d ed. 2000).
38. See id.

976
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means of identifying the product to the particular guild and as a
39
method of attaching certain quality controls over the goods.
Such identifying marks enabled the guilds to compete more
effectively in the marketplace. 40
In the United States, trademark law began as a facet of
unfair competition law that evolved from state "common law,"
deriving from court decisions rather than statutory provisions. 41
Initially, the effect of trademark law was narrow and
geographically constrained, 42 only allowing a manufacturer or
seller to acquire trademark rights through use of a distinctive
mark applied to the goods sold. 43 In addition, a trademark

owner had no rights over another party's later good faith usage
of the mark in a geographically different region. 44 Such a later
user, called the junior user, could therefore secure exclusive
trademark rights in his own region. 45 Furthermore, a trademark
owner had no rights against the usage of his mark in non46
competing goods or services.
The expansion of the national economy in the 1800s then
47
created a need for a federal trademark registration system.
However, the initial attempts to create such a system were
49
unsuccessful. 48 In 1947, Congress enacted the Lanham Act,

under its Commerce Clause power, creating the system of
federal trademark law that many people are familiar with
today.50
39. See id. at 154.
40. See id.

41. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5B, at 5-9.
42. See id.

43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5B, at 5-10. Congress first attempted to
legislate trademark registration in 1870. See id.

48. In 1879, the Supreme Court struck down the 1870 trademark registration
statute, declaring it as unconstitutional because trademark did not qualify for
constitutional protection as a patentable invention or a copyrightable work of
authorship. See id. The Constitution specifically provided Congress the power to
legislate patent and copyright statutes. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. However,
the Court recognized that "Congress could protect trademarks used in interstate
and foreign commerce." CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5B, at 5-10. Thus,

Congress enacted all subsequent trademark legislation, whereby extending
protection to trademarks used in interstate commerce. See id.
49. The Lanham Act comprises 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (2001).
50. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5B, at 5-8.
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Today, trademark law extends an exclusive governmental
grant to the trademark owner, to use "marks that distinguish
one manufacturer, merchant, or service provider's goods or
services from those of others." 51 It serves several commercial
functions, such as: (1) identifying goods or services to
consumers; (2) identifying the origin or source of the goods or
services; (3) acting as a quality assurance badge from the source;
and (4) serving as an advertising tool.52 These functions are
cultivated by balancing four interests: (1) consumer interest in
not being misled as to the source of the goods or services; (2) the
trademark owner's interest in maintaining his goodwill; (3)
consumer and potential competitor interest in free competition
and market entry opportunities; and (4) public interest in an
impartial and effective legal system. 53 The privileges of a
trademark grant can be separated into three components: (1) the
use of a mark; (2) the exclusion of others from using a mark; and
54
(3) the registration of a mark.
A trademark can range in form, from words, a device that
serves to distinguish goods or services, designs, color patterns,
5
scents, packaging, to a product's non-functional design.S
Whatever form the trademark may take, it must be distinctive
and cannot' be confusingly similar to previously used or
registered marks. 56 Even though a mark may qualify as
distinctive, it nevertheless may not be registered if it contains an
57
immoral or functional element.
C.

Trade Dress Law
Trade dress law can be classified as a subset of trademark
law, and thus is protected under the Lanham Act and state
unfair competition laws. 58 Trade dress protection originally
included exclusive rights over the packaging, labeling, or
display of a product, but now may entail the product's "total
image," including its texture, color, shape, size, and other

51. See id. at 5-7.

52. See id. at 5-8.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 5-10.
55. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5B, at 5-7.
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2001).
57. See id. § 1052(a). See also id. § 1052(e).
58. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5B, at 5-31. In this section of the
comment, later references to trademarks or marks also apply to trade dress.
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characteristics.5 9 A trade dress can be registered as a trademark,
but it is also commonly addressed as an unregistered
trademark. 60 If unregistered, the trade dress must have been
able to qualify as a trademark for it to be protected. 6' To prove
infringement of an unregistered trade dress, the owner would
have to prove that the trade dress was distinctive, nonfunctional, 62 and that consumers would likely be confused as to
the source of the product created by the allegedly infringing
use.

63

As with trademarks, trade dress has levels of
distinctiveness: (1) arbitrary or fanciful; (2) suggestive; (3)
descriptive; and (4) generic. 64 Both arbitrary or fanciful trade
dress and suggestive trade dress are inherently distinctive, and
65
they are automatically protected from infringement.
Descriptive trade dress is not inherently distinctive, and thus
must acquire secondary meaning before it can be protected by
law.66 To acquire secondary meaning, consumers must mentally
associate a product feature with the source of the product rather
than with the product itself. 67 Generic trade dress is not
68
distinctive, making it unprotectable.

59. See Gill, supra note 6, at 1280-81.
60. See id.

61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2001).

Even though the Lanham Act protects

unregistered trademarks and trade dress, the benefits of registration far exceed the

costs and resources expended in the registration process. For example, registration
provides nationwide protection from the date of application, while serving notice to
others of the existence of the registered mark. If the owner uses the registered mark
continuously for five years, it may become incontestable, thereby limiting the types
of challenges that an alleged infringer may bring. In litigation, a registered mark

creates an evidentiary presumption on the prima facie validity of the mark. In
counterfeit cases, registered marks also provide enhanced remedies for the owners.
See JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 221-22

(3d ed. 2001).
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2001). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2001).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (2001). Courts determine the likelihood of confusion
by weighing in various factors, such as: "the degree of similarity between the

marks, the proximity of the products, the defendant's intent in selecting the
allegedly infringing mark, evidence of actual confusion, and the strength of the
plaintiff's mark." GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 61, at 392.
64. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5C[3], at 5-59 to 5-60.
65. See generally Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
66. See id. at 769.

67. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159,163 (1995).
68. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
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D. Functionality
While courts agree that functional designs may not gain
trademark or trade dress protection, they differ in their
definition of functionality and its application. 69 Additionally,
there are several types of functionality, such as utilitarian versus
70
aesthetic and de facto versus de jure.
A common definition of functionality can be found in the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, 71 which focuses on
whether the design imparts "benefits in the manufacturing,
marketing, or use of the goods or service," without the design's
importance being "an indication of source." 72 It comments that a
functional design affects competition and cannot be readily
73
available through alternative designs.
Alternatively, courts and legal commentators turn to the
Morton-Norwich factors in determining functionality in trade
dress. 74 In the case of In re Morton-Norwich Products,Inc., the late
Judge Rich discussed de facto and de jure functionality in
product designs. 75 He described de facto functionality as
"functional in the lay sense," meaning that the product design or
76
its features were "directed to the performance of a function."
When de facto functionality is found, trade dress protection is
77
not precluded.
On the other hand, de jure functionality means that the
78
feature or design cannot be protected as a matter of law.

69. See infra Part II.G.
70. See generally CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5C,at 5-40 to 5-50.
71. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). By

"Shepardizing" Morton-Norwich on LexisNexis on September 16, 2002, there were
329 references citing back to Morton-Norwich. Even after Traffix, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) still refers back to the MortonNorwich factors for de jure functionality determination. See, e.g., Valu Engineering,

Inc. v. Rexnord Corporation, 278 F.3d 1268 (2002). Legal scholars, such as Donald
Chisum of Santa Clara University, also discuss these factors in their publications.
See, e.g., CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5C, at 5-40. Morton-Norwich Products,
Inc. had applied for a trademark on its spray bottle design, which were used in
bottles of various cleaners, such as Fantastik® and Glass Plus@. The U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office had rejected the application, which was subsequently
challenged.
75. See In re Morton-Norwich Products,671 F.2d at 1337.
76. See id. (internal quotation omitted).
77. See id.
78. See id.
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Courts consider the following factors in determining de jure
functionality: (1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the
utilitarian advantages of the design; (2) advertising materials in
which the originator of the design touts the design's utilitarian
advantages; (3) the availability of functionality equivalent
designs to competitors; and (4) facts indicating that the design
results in a comparatively simple or cheap method of
manufacturing the product. 79
Another subset of functionality is aesthetic functionality,
applied to aesthetic design elements that are considered crucial
features to the product's commercial success. 80 This terminology
originated from the Restatement, which deemed the aesthetic
features as "functional" when consumers purchased the goods
largely for their aesthetic value. 81 The federal circuit has allowed
trade dress protection for aesthetic designs so as long as
competition was not severely hindered as a result.82
E.

Pre-LanhamAct
Under Supremacy Clause principles, federal patent law
preempts state trademark and unfair competition law in
trademark cases that also involve patents. 83 The Supreme Court
cases in the pre-Lanham Act period produced a "judicially
created doctrine" in the area of public rights when dealing with
84
expired patents.
In one pre-Lanham Act case, Singer Manufacturing Company
v. June Manufacturing Company,8 5 Singer sued its competitor
under Illinois state unfair competition laws for copying the
appearance of its sewing machines as disclosed in its expired
79. See id. at 1340-41. In applying these factors in Morton-Norwich, Judge Rich
seemed to have placed the most importance on the availability of alternative
designs. See id. at 1342. In cases dealing with the existence of a utility patent, a
case-by-case examination is done, to see if the patent discloses any utilitarian
advantage on the disputed feature or design. Thus, the existence of a utility patent
was not an automatic preclusion of trade dress protection, but an evidence of
functionality. See, e.g., In re Weber-Stephen Products Co., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659
(T.T.A.B. 1987) (registering the kettle body and legs design of a barbeque grill as a
trade dress, which the examiner had rejected due to the presumed functionality
stemming from earlier utility patents).
80. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5C, at 5-43.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 5-43 to 5-48.
83. See Gill, supra note 6, at 1282. Prior to the Lanham Act, trademark issues
were governed by state law only. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
84. See Gill, supra note 6, 1282.
85. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
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utility patents. 86 In the patents, Singer had distinguished its
machines from the competition by both function and
appearance. 87 The Supreme Court ruled against Singer, stating
that the invention covered by a utility patent became dedicated
to the public upon expiration. 88 The Court held that once
the invention in the
dedicated to the public, anyone could 8make
9
patent.
the
by
covered
previously
form
90
Similarly, in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., National
Biscuit made and sold shredded wheat in the form of pillowshaped biscuits 9l and held patents covering the machine,
process, and the product itself.92 After the patents expired,
Kellogg also began making a pillow-shaped biscuit cereal that it
called shredded wheat. 93 National Biscuit sued Kellogg under
state unfair competition law for copying the cereal design and
name. 94 The Supreme Court ruled the same way as it did in
by an expired utility
Singer, reiterating that an invention covered
95
domain.
patent has passed into the public
Post-Lanham Act
In 1964, the Supreme Court decided two companion cases
dealing with trade dress and patent law issues, 96 both of which
arose under state unfair competition claims. 97 In Sears, Roebuck
99
& Co. v. Stiffel Co.98 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
the plaintiffs each held design patents on the contested product
configurations, which the lower federal courts invalidated after
°
the plaintiffs brought an infringement suit. 00 The Supreme
Court expanded the public dedication doctrine from Singer and
F.

86. See id. at 172.
87. See id.

88. See id. at 185.
89. See id.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

305 U.S. 111 (1938).
See id. at 113.
See id. at 117.
See id. at 113.
See id. at 115.
See id. at 119-20.

96. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.

Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
97. See Sears, 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
98. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
99. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
100. The parties in Sears produced pole lamps. In Compco, both parties
manufactured fluorescent light fixtures. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 226; Compco, 376 U.S.
at 234.
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Kellogg by equating an invention covered by an expired patent
with an unpatentable invention.101 Furthermore, the Court held
that state unfair competition law could not preempt public
dedication by preventing the public from copying of an

invention no longer protected by patent law. 102

Two decades later, the Supreme Court began to shift its
trade dress analysis. 03 In a footnote to Inwood Laboratories,Inc. v.
Ives Laboratories, Inc,104 the Supreme Court stated that a design
feature was functional "if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." 105 The
Court followed this definition in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Company, Inc., 06 adding that a product feature is functional "if
the exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage"' 0 7-referred to
as the competitive necessity test. 08
Following these cases, the various circuit courts have
applied the functionality definition with varying results. 109 In
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. v. Duracraft Corp.,110 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that functionality in
trademark cases depended upon competitive need."' It held the
disputed feature to be a "significant inventive aspect" of the
invention as covered by the expired utility patent," 2 thus the
Court barred the plaintiff from asserting trade dress protection
on these grounds. 113 The expired utility patent would enter
public domain."4 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit Court

101. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
102. See Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
103. See infra note 105-08 and accompanying text.
104. 456 U.S. 844 (1982). In Inwood, the dispute centered upon generic drug
manufacturers producing the same-looking pharmaceutical capsules, in which the
utility patent for the pharmaceutical had expired. The capsule's color was found to
be functional because it assisted the patients' recognition of the medicine. See id.
105. Id. at 850.
106. 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
850 (1982)).
107. See id. at 165.
108. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
109. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
110. 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995). The product design at issue involved
household fan grills with spiral vanes. See id.
111. See id. at 1507.
112. See id. at 1510.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1509.
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115
of Appeals in Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp. determined
that the expired utility patent in the case did not prevent the
disclosed product configuration from gaining trade dress
configuration was not
protection because the challenged
6
described in the patent claims."

G. Related Copyright Law
Copyright law has also addressed the difficulties present in
separating functional and aesthetic aspects of industrial designs,
117 Just as it is
wherein objects of beauty and utility have merged.
true for trademark law, copyright law does not extend any
protection of which
protection to functional, utilitarian features,
118
law.
patent
is the exclusive province of
Until Mazer v. Stein," 9 it was not clear whether the law
allowed copyright protection of artistic works within an
industrial design.120 Mazer involved the copyrightability of
Balinese dancer statuettes incorporated as bases of table
lamps.' 2 ' The Supreme Court upheld the copyright protection
for works embodied in utilitarian objects as to their form but not
as to their functional features. 122 In dicta, the Mazer Court also
commented that possession of a design patent did not preclude
123
copyright protection.
Subsequently, section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act
124
codified the separability standard created in Mazer. According
to this section, the difference between copyrightable works of
applied art and uncopyrightable industrial design lies in
whether the design of a useful article "incorporates pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the

115. 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff held an expired patent on a twopiece cable tie with an oval head, where the shape of the head was not stated in the
claims. After the patent had expired, the defendant started to sell a similar cable tie.
See id.
116. See id. at 291.
117. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 116 (3d ed.

1999).
118. See id.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

347 U.S. 201 (1954).
See LEAFFER, supra note 117.
See id. at 117.
See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 215.
See id.
See LEAFFER, supra note 117, at 118.
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utilitarian aspects of the article."125 Yet, the courts have
struggled in crafting a uniform test to determine separability, as
a result of the subjectivity involved in weighing the aesthetic
and utilitarian elements. 126
For instance, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific
Lumber Co., 1 27 the majority and the dissent expressed two very
different views of how to separate the elements.128 According to
the majority, if the design components of the product indicate
the designer's artistic judgment independent of functional
considerations, then the artistic facet can be conceptually
separated. 129 The dissent countered that separability of the
disputed article should be based upon how the article was
perceived, rather than the process used by the designer.130
H. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. 131
In Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the trade
dress dispute centered upon an invention that had an expired
utility patent.132 The invention at issue was an outdoor, portable
sign, typically used in roadside construction to post warning
messages and in gas stations to inform the consumer of gasoline
prices. 133 The distinguishing feature of the sign was its design,
which enabled it to withstand wind conditions of up to eighty
miles per hour without tipping over or wobbling, while
remaining lightweight and portable 34 One of the key inventive

125. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001) (paragraph beginning with "Pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works").
126. See LEAFFER, supra note 117, at 120. For example, the Second Circuit applied

a conceptual separation test in one case, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, while
applying more of a physical separation test in another, Carol Barnhart Inc. v.
Economy Cover Corp. In Kieselstein-Cord, the court found the ornamental aspect of a
belt buckle design to be separable from its utilitarian function. Yet, the court found

the aesthetic features to be "inextricably related to the utilitarian function" in Carol
Barnhart for torso mannequins used for clothing display. See LEAFFER, supra note
117, at 120-21.
127. 842 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). Brandir involved the copyrightability of a
bicycle rack design of bent metal tubing in a serpentine, coiled pattern. See id.
128. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
129. See Brandir, 842 F.2d at 1145-46. The majority adopted a test proposed by
Professor Denicola, who wrote the article Applied Art and Industrial Design: A

Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles. See id. at 1145.
130. See Brandir,842 F.2d at 1150-52.

131. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
132. See id. at 26.
133. See Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1315 (9th Cir. 1983).
134. See id.
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mechanisms of the sign was its dual-spring design. 135 Under
ordinary conditions, the two springs would be sufficiently rigid
the
to support the sign upright.136 However, if high winds blew,
137
deflect.
would
sign
display
the
and
springs would bend,
In 1972, the PTO granted Robert Sarkisian utility patents for
the dual spring signs, United States Patent Nos. 3,646,696,and
138
3,662,482 (the '696 patent and the '482 patent, respectively).
Sarkisian later brought a double patent infringement lawsuit,
with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finding that the
defendant's sign stand infringed the '696 patent under the
1 39
doctrine of equivalents and invalidating the '482 patent.
Eventually, Marketing Displays, Inc. (MDI) became the holder of
the '696 patent.140 MDI produced the patented signs under the
name "Windmaster."'141
After the '696 patent expired, 142 TrafFix Devices 143 began to
manufacture and sell portable, outdoor signs, under the name
"Windbuster." 144 The "Windbuster" signs appeared similar to
the MDI "Windmaster," including a dual-spring design. 145 MDI
sued, alleging that buyers and users would associate the signs
the
with MDI because of the visible dual-spring near the base of146
claim.
dress
trade
the
of
basis
the
became
allegation
this
sign;
MDI brought suit against TrafFix under the Lanham Act in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan. 147 The court ruled against MDI, found the feature was
functional, and determined that MDI had not acquired

135. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 30.
136. See Sarkisian, 697 F.2d at 1315.
137. See id. at 1315.
138. See U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696 (issued Mar. 7, 1972). See also U.S. Patent No.
3,662,482 (issued May 16, 1972). A pair of springs were disclosed in the claims of
both patents. This meant that Sarkisian intended to have patent protection
extended to the dual springs.
139. See Sarkisian, 697 F.2d at 1315.
140. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 25.
141. See id.
142. Since the '696 patent was issued in 1972, it would have expired in 1989,
based on the patent law that was in effect at the time of issuance.
143. The spelling of the company name is not a typo. When referring to the
company, it will be spelled as "Traffix Devices." When the comment is citing back
to the case, it will be spelled Traffix with two lower case f's.
144. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 26.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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secondary meaning in its alleged trade dress claims. 148
However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because
the District Court errored by only focusing on the dual-spring
design when evaluating MDI's trade dress.1 49 It explained that a
competitor could choose to use MDI's dual-spring design
because the patent had expired, but the competitor would have
to find some way to distinguish its sign from MDI's trade
dress. 150 The court also noted that exclusive use of a feature
under a trade dress claim, such as the dual-springs, must place
competitors
at a
"'significant,
non-reputation-related
disadvantage' before trade dress protection is denied on the
functionality grounds."'151 The Sixth Circuit observed that there
was a split among the Courts of Appeals in the other Circuits as
to whether an expired utility patent would preclude a patentee
from claiming trade dress protection for a product's design.152
After the Sixth Circuit decision, TrafFix requested certiorari,
which the Supreme Court granted, deciding this case on March
20, 2001.153 The Court found that MDI did not meet the burden
of "overcoming the strong evidentiary inference of functionality
based on the disclosure of the dual-spring design in the claims of
the expired patents."'154 The Court examined extrinsic evidence
from the Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp. case 5 5 and the patent

prosecution history, 156 and it deemed the springs necessary to
the operation of the overall invention. 5 7 Consequently, the
Court barred MDI from asserting trade dress claims for the dualspring design. 158
In the Traffix decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that
"trade dress can be protected under federal law." 59 It
paraphrased the Lanham Act, stating that the party seeking to
assert trade dress protection in a civil action possesses the
burden of proof in establishing the non-functionality of the

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See id. at 26.
See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 27.
See id.
See id. at 27-28.
See id. at 28.
See id. at 23.
See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 30.
See id. at 30-31.
See id. at 31-32.
See id. at 33-34.
See id. at 35.
See id. at 28.
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matter for which it seeks protection. 160 With respect to the
existence of an expired utility patent in trade dress cases, the
Court concluded that the utility patent "is strong evidence that
features therein claimed are functional," providing "great
weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed
functional until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade
dress protection." 161 Furthermore, the Court added that the
party requesting trade dress protection has the burden of
demonstrating the non-functionality of the feature "by showing
that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of
the device." 162 In its Traffix ruling, the Supreme Court sidestepped the question raised by the Sixth Circuit with respect to
the possibility of alternative designs, 163 as well as the question
raised by TrafFix and some of its amici: the constitutionality of
164
trade dress claims for products with expired utility patents.
I1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
165
Although asserting trade dress requires several elements,
the non-functionality requirement has been the most thorny;
characterizing functionality is problematic as a result of the
subjectivity involved and the danger of interchanging the legal
and layman aspects of the term. 66 Even though courts agree
that a feature disclosed in an expired utility patent is evidence of
functionality, 167 they have not given consistent weight to this
evidence, as they struggle with their own respective outlooks on
168
functionality.
As a result of the inherent difficulties in resolving this issue,
the Supreme Court attempted to refine its test for functionality
in Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.169 According to
the Court, functionality of a feature is presumed, if disclosed in
an expired utility patent.' 70 This presumption bars a trade dress
160. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 29.
161. Id. at 29-30.
162. Id. at 30.
163. See id. at 33-34.
164. See id. at 35.
165. See supra Part II.C.
166. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5C,at 5-40.
167. See supra Part II.D.
168. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001)
(referring to the split in the circuit courts' decisions on a trade dress bar when
expired utility patents are involved).
169. 532 U.S. 23, 29-30 (2001).
170. See id.
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claim unless it is successfully rebutted. 171 This new test has
simplified matters because the presumption creates a very tall
hurdle for one who wants to assert a trade dress claim for a
product with an expired utility patent. 172 Following the latest
makeover for functionality in such cases, it remains to be seen
how parties seeking trade dress protection will challenge the
boundaries in infringement cases.
IV. ANALYSIS

A.

Interpretationof the Traffix Ruling
In Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 1 73 a
unanimous Court set out several rules to "clear up" the muddy
waters that result when trade dress claims and expired utility
patents intersect. 174 First, it reiterated that the Lanham Act
placed the burden of proof on the party seeking trade dress
protection for establishing that the feature at issue is not
functional. 175 By starting with this aspect of the Lanham Act, 176
the Court reminded the parties that functional product features
177
could not be protected.
Second, the Supreme Court addressed the role an expired
utility patent plays in a trade dress infringement suit. 178 It
explained that an expired utility patent greatly bolsters the
statutory presumption that the features claimed in the patent are
deemed functional until demonstrated otherwise.1 79 The Court
eschewed the extremism that TrafFix advocated, under which an
expired utility patent would be clear evidence of functionality
and thus would completely bar a trade dress claim.1 80 Its precise
and careful diction in summarizing the significance of an
expired utility patent left the door ajar for a rebuttal.' 81
Furthermore, . it even provided appropriate examples for a
171. See id. at 30.
172. See Kevin Galbraith, 2001 Panel Discussion on Current Issues in Trademark
Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 509, 526 (2001).
173. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id.
See id. at 29.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 29.
See id. at 29-30.
See id.
See id. at 35.
See id. at 30.
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rebuttal, such as features that were "merely an ornamental,
182
incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device."
Finally, the Supreme Court distinguished its ruling from
that of the Sixth Circuit, drawing a distinction between
utilitarian and aesthetic functionality by clarifying its holding
from Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.1 83 The Court opined

that the Sixth Circuit misunderstood its Qualitex formulation for
utilitarian functionality. 84 It reiterated its Qualitex definition:
"'in general terms, a product feature is functional,' and cannot
serve as a trademark, 'if it is essential to the use or purpose of
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." ' 185 The
Courts of Appeals had morphed this standard into a test defined
by "competitive need." 86 The Court explained, however, that
Qualitex did not dislodge the traditional rule as formulated in
Inwood but merely quoted it.187 The Court ruled that it was
proper to examine
"significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage" in aesthetic functionality cases. 88 The Courts of
Appeals have interpreted that statement to mean that they
189
should consider whether there were other design possibilities.
Consequently, since the issue in Traffix was one of utilitarian
functionality, the Supreme Court did not ponder alternative
designs, in contrast to the Sixth Circuit's contemplation of the
possibility of a three or four spring design. 190
B. Analyzing the Traffix Ruling
In layman terms, the Supreme Court made the right call by
gainsaying MDI's trade dress claims, or MDI would have
enjoyed an indefinite monopoly over the use of the dual-spring
design. 191 By examining the expired patents, the patent
prosecution history, and the prior patent infringement suit-as
182.
183.
184.
185.

See
See
See
See

id.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
Traffix, 532 U.S. at 32-35.
id. at 1261 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159,

165 (1995) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 465 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982))).
186. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 32-33 (quoting Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995)).

187. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 33.
188. See id.
189. See id.

190. See id. The consideration of alternative designs, such as a three or four
spring design, is an application of the Morton-Norwich factors. See supra Part II.D.

191. See Gill, supra note 6, at 1269.
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the Supreme Court did-most practitioners would find MDI's
case weak at best.192 Based on the evidence MDI presented, the
dual-spring design was not an arbitrary byproduct of the
invention or an ornamental creation, but aided the overall
effectiveness of the invention by allowing the sign to bend
without tipping over.193 Consequently, it was relatively easy for
the Supreme Court to decide the case on the grounds of
94
functionality under these facts.
By redirecting the functionality definition to the Inwood
formulation of being just "essential to the use or purpose of the
article" or affecting "the cost or quality of the article," 195 the
Supreme Court may have skewed the outcome of future cases.
It broadened the meaning enough to encompass features that
could formally have been found de facto functional so that they
would now be de jure functional. 19 6 The Court's removal of the
examination of alternative designs, without further clarification,
revitalized the Inwood definition of functionality. In addition, it
left the trier of fact more likely to find the disputed feature
functional because there is no other reference point to compare
against for a finding of de facto functionality. In essence, Traffix
has the potential to eviscerate the distinction of de facto and de
jure functionality, undermining existing policies and procedures
97
for determining functionality.
Furthermore, with respect to leaving room for a rebuttal in
presumed functionality, the Supreme Court offered little
guidance for determining whether product features were
ornamental, arbitrary, or incidental. 198
By removing the
192. See Galbraith, supra note 172, at 528.
193. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 30-32. Furthermore, the springs were in the claims in
the expired utility patent, which would indicate that they were a part of the
invention. See U.S. Patent No. 3,646,696 (issued Mar. 7, 1972).
194. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 30-32.
195. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 (1982).
196. See supra Part ll.D.
197. Actually, this situation has begun to unfold. The PTO trademark
examining attorneys will stop making de facto and de jure functionality distinctions
in rejecting applications. However, if a feature or product design is de facto
functional, the registration of such feature or design is not precluded, even after
Traffix. See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.02(a)(iii)(B) (3d
ed. 2001). Cf.TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.03(a) (2d ed.
1997) (describing de facto and de jure functionality as a part of the examination
procedure).
198. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 34. The Supreme Court used the dual spring sign as
an example. If it had "arbitrary curves in the legs or an ornamental pattern painted
on the springs," then the Court could have reached a different finding. See id.
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991

possibility of examining alternative designs, it also made it more
difficult for parties trying to rebut functionality to prove that a
feature or design is arbitrary or incidental, although that has not
been the traditional use of the alternative designs argument.1 99
The lack of guidance leaves such cases open to an even more
subjective case-by-case determination.
Even though the Court has not established a bright-line test
for separating ornamental, arbitrary, or incidental features in
trade dress, the case history of copyright law for applied art in
industrial designs presents an interesting analogy. 200 This area
of law has been problematic because of the subjectivity involved
20 1
in trying to separate functional and aesthetic features.
Developing a more uniform or predictable process in separating
trade dress features will be just as challenging for the courts,
although the aesthetic threshold does not have to be very high in
trade dress cases.
Moreover, by focusing its analysis on a particular feature
rather than taking into consideration all of the features of the
product design, the Supreme Court overruled the analyses of
both the Courts of Appeals 202 and what the United States Patent
and Trademark Office practices. 20 3 The particular feature
However, this hypothetical with the dual spring sign does not offer much of a
bright line rule on how to determine whether something is ornamental, arbitrary, or
incidental. In a post-Traffix case, Metrokane, Inc. v. The Wine Enthusiast, the district
court determined a corkscrew design, although clearly derived from an expired
utility patent, was ornamental because of the shape of the components did resemble
a rabbit's head and ears. Metrokane marketed and sold the Rabbit corkscrew. The
shapes and curves in the Rabbit fell within the narrow functionality exception in
Traffix. See Metrokane, Inc. v. The Wine Enthusiast, 160 F. Supp 2d 633, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
199. See, e.g., Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351
(5th Cir. 2002). Eppendorf manufactured pipette tips, and Ritter copied Eppendorf's
product designs. See id. at 354. The district court ruled that Eppendorf's designs
were not functional by finding alternative designs, but the Fifth Circuit reversed
because of the Traffix functionality formulation of being essential to the use or
purpose. See id. at 354-55. Even though Eppendorf only raised the alternative
designs argument to demonstrate non-functionality of its product design, it could
be argued that the alternative designs could show Eppendorf's pipette
configuration was arbitrary or incidental. Common sense would dictate that
different designs could exist for pipette tips, such as varying the shape and size of
the pipette tip components.
200. See supra Part II.G.
201. See supra Part II.G.
202. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5C, at 5-42.
203. See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1202.03(a)(iii) (2d
ed. 1997) (describing that a product design as a whole should be considered in
determining functionality).
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analysis for trade dress also reflects the opposite of that for
design patent application evaluation and the recommended
procedure for de jure functionality examination for trade
dress. 204 According to the Manual for Patent Examining
Procedure, the examiner is to view the invention in its entirety,
rather than individual features, in his determination of a
product's non-functionality or ornamentality. 205 In trade dress
cases, courts commonly discuss design patents because these
two areas of law have similar required elements. 20 6 Therefore, a
different functionality analysis in these two areas presents
confusion for both judges and patent or trademark examiners.
C.

The Merits of the Traffix Ruling
In Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,207 the
Supreme Court created a judicially expedient procedure for
resolving trade dress infringement cases when expired utility
patents are also involved. By focusing on the functionality aspect
of the feature first and presuming that functionality exists when
there is an expired patent, this procedure also avoids an analysis
of the feature's inherent distinctiveness, secondary meaning, and
alternative feature designs in most cases because that
presumption is challenging to overcome. 20 8 Clarifying the
functionality presumption and placing the burden of proof on
the party seeking trade dress protection 209 results in the courts
hearing fewer trade dress infringement suits involving expired
utility patents, reducing judicial involvement in patent claim
interpretation. 210
The Supreme Court simplified trade dress functionality
determinations that involve expired utility patents. 21 1
By
articulating a presumption of functionality for a feature
204. See MPEP, supra note 20, § 1504.01(c) at 1500-14 to -15.
205. See id.

206. See Ronald J. Horta, Without Secondary Meaning, Do Product Design Trade
Dress Protections Function as Infinite Patents?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 113, 123-29
(1993).
207. -532 U.S. 23 (2001).
208. See id. at 33-34.
209. See id. at 29-30.
210. Judges conduct a Markman hearing, to interpret the disputed patent claims.
See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)
(determining that claims interpretation was a matter of law to be done by judges
only, giving rise to the term Markman hearing).
211. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 29-30 (on the strong presumption of functionality
when expired utility patents are involved).
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disclosed in an expired utility patent,212 the Court made the
functionality analysis straightforward for courts to apply when
similar fact patterns arise. As a result of this decision, judges
and attorneys no longer have to spend hours wading through
case law dealing with functionality. Yet, the Traffix ruling on the
significance of expired utility patents was not overly extreme,
leaving room for rebuttal if the party seeking trade dress
protection could demonstrate that a disclosed feature in the
patent was a "merely ornamental, fanciful, or arbitrary aspect of
213
the device."
From a public policy standpoint, the Traffix ruling
propagated a sense of fairness by broadcasting a clear message
to businesses that they cannot manipulate trademark laws to
extend their monopoly on functional features disclosed in an
expired utility patent. 214 This ruling restored balance to patent
law, while settling such trade dress claims. It underscored the
quid pro quo aspects of patent law, whereby disclosing an
invention to the public earns the patent holder a limited
monopoly to exclude others. 215 The framers of the Constitution
and Congress designed patent law to provide incentives for
inventors to create and disclose their invention, with the trade
off that the disclosed information would stimulate new
innovation. 216 Although MDI was not the first company to
assert a trade dress claim on a functional feature previously
disclosed in an expired utility patent, and it probably will not be
the last, the Traffix ruling builds significant barriers to attempts
to beat the system.
D.

The Possible Falloutof Traffix

Presuming functionality in a trade dress infringement case
in which the disputed feature was disclosed in an expired utility
patent not only creates an enormous hurdle for trade dress
assertions, but may also spur businesses in unabashedly copying
product features from expired utility patents. 217 The removal of

212. See id.
213. Id. at 30.

214. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 2, § 5C, at 5-39.
215. See id.
216. See id.

217. See Joanne Hepburn, Legal Update: Caution: Roadblock Ahead: Patent Revealing
Traffic Sign Stand's Functionality Prevents Trade Dress Protection,7 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH.
L. 413, 420 (2001).
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obstacles to copying product features could cause society more
harm than benefit. Some commentators would argue that
copying could stimulate new ideas and designs that would
advance competition, and that competition would in turn benefit
consumers by providing more product choices at lower prices. 218
However, history and the competitive nature of business
indicate that most companies find that the easiest way to
penetrate an established market with the least amount of effort
is by imitating the market leader rather than trying new ideas. 219
Such imitation removes a great deal of creativity and ingenuity
from a product marketing or engineering standpoint. 22 0
Assuming that the imitated product feature was truly
distinct and recognized by consumers as originating from the
market leader, such imitation likely would abuse the consumers'
trust and ruin the market leader's goodwill. 221 The outcome of
Traffix could return the American consumer market to the days
of Sears-Compco, when the Warren era of the Supreme Court
ruled that all of the contents within an expired utility patent
would pass into the public domain and thereby promoting
competition while benefiting society more. 222

The Traffix

decision promotes the same message and will likely yield the
same outcome.
To prevent uncontrolled product feature copying,
companies will instruct their respective intellectual property
counsel to devise other ways to protect their creations. One
possibility is for companies to protect product designs via
copyright law, if the design contains aesthetic components that
could be separated from the functional, utilitarian
components.2 23
Companies could thus obtain protection
through copyright in case their trade dress assertion fails. 224

Alternatively, patent attorneys might advise inventors to
generate a design patent from the invention slated for a utility
patent. 225 Congress intended design patents protect ornamental
218. See Galbraith, supra note 172, at 528.
219. See supra Part II.F-G.

220. See supra Part II.F-G.
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See supra Part II.F.
223. See supra Part II.G.
224. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding the copyright infringement but stating that the plaintiff failed to prove a
trade dress claim).
225. See Galbraith, supra note 172, at 536-43.
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designs, 226 so however, obtaining such protection might require
the inventor to implement ornamental facets into the invention.
To obtain a design patent, an applicant must prove novelty and
nonobviousness, just as in the case of a utility patent, but the
design cannot be functional. 227 Thus, the applicant should
prosecute both the design and utility patent applications
of opportunity to apply and
concurrently because the window
228
limited.
is
receive design patents
Some commentators argue that the requirements for a
design patent are more difficult to meet than the ones for trade
dress protection, and note that the protection period for a design
patent is only fourteen years. 229 However, acquiring trade dress
protection, while easier to achieve through distinctiveness or
secondary meaning, requires the product to be in the market
before the protection applies, exposing the product to potential
competitors unprotected by a patent. 230 On the other hand, a
design patent provides fourteen years of protection, including
the time before the product enters the market, 231 and affords
greater protection against infringement. 232 Case law suggests
that a company could obtain trade dress protection after a
design patent has expired, if a product has acquired secondary
meaning sufficient to meet trade dress standards. 233 However, it
remains to be seen how the courts will handle trade dress claims
involving both expired utility and design patents covering
features of the same product. Nevertheless, it is possible that
products could be better protected by a design patent and trade
dress combination.
However, if a design patent is not feasible, patent
prosecutors may examine the relationship between the inver$ive
226. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
228. This statement may seem counterintuitive because utility and design
patents protect different aspects of an article. However, for example, a patent
examiner may reject a later design patent application for a lack of novelty based on
35 U.S.C. § 102, citing to the earlier utility patent for the same article. The earlier
utility patent may have disclosed ornamental elements through the drawings that
the later design patent application now claims.
229. See Galbraith, supra note 172, at 536.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See LEAFFER, supra note 117, at 124 (noting that design patent owners can
enforce their patent against "a design substantially similar in appearance, even
those persons who have not copied the design").
233. See Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991).
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aspect of the invention and the appearance of the invention
more closely. They may draft the patent in a way that may better
enable the patent owner to claim trade dress protection later on.
V.

PROPOSAL

The Supreme Court provided its own answers for resolving
trade dress infringement claims involving expired utility patents
by taking a firm stand against the monopolization of a
functional feature previously disclosed in a patent through the
backdoor of trademark law.234 However, in the process it left
intellectual property practitioners and scholars searching for a
more complete answer to the protection issues raised by trade
dress. Basic functionality questions remain unanswered, and the
Court failed to consider the multitude of potential effects that
Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. 235 could
promulgate.
In the ideal world, the solution for resolving the
functionality issues in trade dress claims would embrace the
fundamental goals of both trademark and patent law, while
advancing each area's different interests.
Trademark law
protects both the manufacturer and the consumer through the
exclusive and indefinite use of a unique product identifier,
preventing other businesses from palming off the goodwill of
the manufacturer and confusing the consumers as to the source
of the product.23 6 In contrast, patent law's quid pro quo system
promotes protecting inventors by granting limited exclusionary
rights while providing the public with the information about the
invention that could lead to new inventions. 237
Formulating a fair and balanced solution for both
trademark and patent interests requires several subjective
inquiries. Legislators should consider the possibilities from both
an inventive and consumer viewpoint and should examine the
product or invention in question in its entirety and as a product
of its individual components. This examination should ferret
out de jure functionality in the disputed feature set to prevent
trade dress abuse. This inquiry assumes that there also could be
de facto functionality for the individual components or the

234. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
235. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
236. See supra Part lI.B.
237. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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whole product. However, de facto functionality should not be an
238
issue for trade dress assertions.
The starting point of the analysis should be the inventor's
perspective so that the purpose and the enabling mechanism of
the invention or product can be understood. For instance,
questions to ask would be what is the invention or product and
what does it do? The next part of the inquiry should come from
the consumer's perspective because the consumer determines
the ultimate value of a product. Why would a reasonable
consumer purchase this product? If the disputed feature or
overall product configuration were removed and the overall
effectiveness of the product were reduced to that of the prior art,
would the reasonable consumer decline to purchase the
product? If the answer to this question is yes, then the feature is
de jure functional and should automatically be barred from
trade dress protection.
Applying the previous questions to the facts of Traffix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. helps to illustrate their
effectiveness. 239 The MDI utility patents covered a design that
prevented outdoor signs from being blown down by strong
gusts of wind because the dual-springs design at the base
enabled the sign to bend.240 The reasonable consumer bought
these signs because they could withstand strong gusts of wind
without tipping over. 241 If the dual springs were removed, the
sign would be like other signs, with solid supporting legs all
around, and would tip over under windy conditions. As a
result, it is unlikely that a reasonable consumer would consider
buying a sign from MDI over any other if the dual springs were
gone. This result leads to the conclusion that the dual springs
are de jure functional and that the product should be barred
from trade dress protection.
Hypothetically, if the MDI signs had rounded edges and an
oblong shape for the sign frame and Traffix copied the same
look for its sign, MDI could probably assert trade dress
protection successfully because the purpose of the sign's dual
springs was to withstand strong gusts of wind. The dispute
over the copied appearance of the sign frame would have little
to do with the product's valuable element, namely wind
238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra Part II.D.
See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
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resistance, which was the reason that the reasonable consumer
bought the signs. The appearance of the sign frame would not
be de jure functional, and thus trade dress protection for the sign
frame would not be automatically barred.
Even by enumerating these proposed guidelines for a
functionality analysis in a trade dress claim, the judicial and
legislative branches continue to face many challenges in shaping
fair policy in this area of law. The concept of functionality is
subjective, and various commercial and societal issues obfuscate
the appropriate meaning of functionality. The best long-term
solution is for Congress to add amendments to both trademark
and patent law delineating the boundaries of functionality more
clearly, such that a single definition of functionality would apply
to both areas of law. This uniformity is important because, as
more patented inventions and designs enter the marketplace,
more patents on those inventions and designs will intersect with
trademark protection.
Furthermore, if the Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc. 242 decision prompts more design patent applications, then
patent examiners should consider the invention in its entirety
when evaluating its ornamental and non-functional qualities. 243
This examination methodology runs counter to what the
Supreme Court ruled in Traffix. 244
From a public policy
standpoint, this disparity is undesirable because trade dress and
design patent protection are similar in that both consider the
non-functional aspects of a product and both are regulated by
the same governmental agency. Such differences could come
into play later as more businesses assert trade dress for features
covered in expired design patents.
Once again, whatever definition Congress enacts for
functionality determinations, it should be applicable to both
trade dress and design patent protection. Any differences in
regulation between the two areas should be harmonized so that
they are compatible with one another, in a way that they do not
cancel each other out or create a system wherein one is favored
over the other. In addition, the courts and the United States
Patent and Trademark Office should use the same guidelines to
resolve such complex cases.
242. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
243. For a discussion on the procedures a patent examiner uses to evaluate a
design patent, see supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
244. See Traffix, 532 U.S. at 32-33.
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VI. CONCLUSION

245
With Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.

decided, intellectual property scholars and practitioners are left
to sort out the future of trade dress cases as it relates to
trademark and patent law. The Supreme Court's decision in
Traffix turned the evaluation procedure for functionality upside
down, and made trade dress assertions extremely difficult when
246
the disputed feature is disclosed in an expired utility patent.
This shift in the standards for evaluating functionality has left
more questions than answers. The Supreme Court made a bold
move in resolving the confusion created by the Courts of
Appeals by taking a firm stand as to how to characterize
functionality for trade dress when expired utility patents are
involved. Nevertheless, its Traffix ruling did not effectively
balance the overall aims of trademark and patent law. Rather, it
prevented the subversion of patent law through the trade dress
loophole, while leaving consumers and businesses open to
uncontrolled product design copying. As Congress and the
courts further refine the definition of functionality, more
thought should be placed on the balancing of trademark and
patent law interests and the promotion of a consistent,
compatible, and harmonized policy applicable to both
trademark and patent law. The only certainty for the future in
this area of law is the growing complexity in the interaction
between trademarks and patents. As more companies apply for
patents for their products, they will use every competitive
advantage that they can, trademark or patent, to protect and
market their product.

245. See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
246. See generally Traffix, 532 U.S. 23.
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